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I. INTRODUCTION
Media coverage surrounding the New York City Department of Health’s recent
portion-cap on sugary beverages sold in food service establishments tends to focus
on public opinions regarding the role of government. 1 Within this dialogue, there are
two camps. On one hand lies the opposition; these individuals criticize the
Department of Health as a “nanny state” involving itself with individual
consumption choices. 2 On the other side lay the supporters who recognize the
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1 See Alexandra Sifferlin, From the NYC Soda Ban Hearing: The Best Arguments For
HEALTHLAND
(July
25,
2012),
and
Against,
TIME
http://healthland.time.com/2012/07/25/from-the-nyc-soda-ban-hearing-the-best-argumentsfor-and-against/. The portion-cap would prevent food service establishments (FSEs) from
selling sugary drinks in containers larger than 16 oz. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 24
§ 81.53 (2012).
2 See Karen Harned, The Michael Bloomberg Nanny State in New York: A Cautionary
Tale, FORBES (May 10, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2013/05/10/the-michaelbloomberg-nanny-state-in-new-york-a-cautionary-tale/; Katrina Trinko, Soda Ban? What
(Mar.
10,
2013),
About
Personal
Choice?,
USA
TODAY
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gravity of the obesity epidemic and applaud government efforts to ameliorate its
effects. 3
Regardless of public debate, the judiciary bears a single task: to determine
whether or not the regulations are lawful. In its decision to strike the portion-cap, the
New York Court of Appeals, affirming the decision of the Appellate Division, First
Department, 4 failed to meet that task in New York Statewide Coalition of Hispanic
Chambers of Commerce v. The New York City Department of Health and Mental
Hygiene. 5 Instead, it made its own subjective determination that these regulations
were too political to be promulgated by an administrative agency. 6
However, we cannot entirely blame the court - it simply relied on bad precedent
set by Boreali v. Axelrod. 7 In that case, the New York Court of Appeals, relying on
antiquated notions of non-delegation arising from the New Deal era, struck down the
Public Health Council’s regulations restricting smoking in public areas, finding that
the Council acted “outside of its proper sphere of authority.” 8
This article stands for the position that the Boreali decision improperly relied on
an outdated view of agency delegation and strayed from both state and federal
precedents allowing broad delegations of legislative power to the Department of
Health. The decision created a precedent whereby the judiciary may supplant agency
expertise with its subjective politics, as evidenced in Statewide. Accordingly, the
New York Court of Appeals failed to return authority to the Department of Health
when it upheld the Appellate Division’s ruling and relied on Boreali.
Part II of this article discusses obesity and the proposed portion-cap at issue in
Statewide, summarizing arguments both in favor of and against its enactment. Part
III summarizes the Statewide and Boreali decisions, emphasizing their faulty
reliance on the non-delegation doctrine. Part IV discusses the history of the New
York City Department of Health, highlighting its eminence as an entity designated
with broad legislative authority to govern all matters relating to public health, both
from the plain language of the city charter and its history as a physician-led agency.
Part V and VI lay out the evolution of the non-delegation doctrine in the U.S.
http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2013/03/10/soda-ban-what-about-personal-choicecolumn/1977091/.
3

See Nadia Arumugam, Why Soda Ban Will Work in Fight Against Obesity; Food
(Sept.
14,
2012),
Regulations
Have
Proven
Record,
FORBES
http://www.forbes.com/sites/nadiaarumugam/2012/09/14/why-soda-ban-will-work-in-fightagainst-obesity-food-regulations-have-a-proven-record/; Richard Buery, Keeping the
Oversized Soda Fight in Perspective, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 23, 2013),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/richard-buery/new-york-soda-ban_b_3750419.html.
4

See N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. The N.Y.C. Dep’t of
Health and Mental Hygiene, 970 N.Y.S.2d 200 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013); aff’d (N.Y. July 2014)
[hereinafter Statewide].
5

See id.

6 See id. at 213 This effort to strike “the proper balance among health concerns, costs and
privacy interests . . . is a uniquely legislative function.” Boreali v. Axelrod, 71 N.Y.2d 1,14
(N.Y. 1987).
7

See Boreali, 71 N.Y.2d 1.

8

Id. at 12 (citing Picone v. Comm’r of Licenses, 149 N.E. 336 (N.Y. 1980)).
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Supreme Court and various state courts, illustrating the error in Boreali’s and
Statewide’s reliance on the doctrine. Part VII discusses suggestions for the Court of
Appeals, the Mayor, and the Department of Health in implementing future public
health regulations in New York City.
II. OBESITY AND THE PORTION-CAP
The Center for Disease Control has formally recognized obesity as a public
health crisis affecting 34.9% of American adults and 17% of children between the
ages of two and nineteen. 9 The Surgeon General has associated obesity with health
problems such as heart disease, type 2 diabetes, stroke, certain types of cancer, and
osteoarthritis. 10 In addition, obesity affects minority populations more strongly than
other groups. 11 Studies from the Center for Disease Control indicate that obesity
disproportionately affects minority populations, with 47.8% of non-Hispanic black
Americans suffering from obesity, followed by 42.5% of Hispanic Americans. 12
Given the gravity of the problem, it should come as no surprise that state and
local governments have begun implementing aggressive food and health-related
initiatives toward combating the epidemic. New York City, in particular, has been a
leader in this area. For example, over the last five years alone, the New York City
Department of Health, through its policy-making arm, the Board of Health, became
the first local agency in the United States to ban the use of artificial trans fats in
restaurant foods 13 and to require franchise restaurants to post calorie counts on menu
boards. 14
New York City’s initiatives have not gone unnoticed. Its caloric content
amendment was not only implemented by California, Maine, New Jersey, and
Vermont, but was also integrated into the federal Affordable Care Act. 15
Furthermore, in the fall of 2014 the FDA announced its intent to regulate e-cigarettes

9 See Overweight and Obesity, Data and Statistics, Facts, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION (Sept. 3, 2014), http://www.cdc.gov/obesity/data/facts.html.
10

See Kathleen Sebelius, Statement on National Childhood Obesity Awareness Month,
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. (Aug. 31, 2012) (discussing the public health
hazards
of
obesity),
http://wayback.archiveit.org/3926/20150121155321/http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2012pres/08/20120831a.html
(last visited Feb. 3, 2015).
11 See Overweight and Obesity, Data and Statistics, Facts, Adult Obesity Facts, CTR. FOR
DISEASE
CONTROL
AND
PREVENTION
(Sept.
3,
2014),
http://www.cdc.gov/obesity/data/adult.html.
12

See id.

13

See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 24 § 81.08 (2012).

14

See Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, Trans Fat and Menu Labeling Legislation,
http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/health/trans-fat-and-menuNCSL.ORG (Jan. 2013)
labeling-legislation.aspx.
15 See id.; see also Paul A. Diller, Local Health Agencies, the Bloomberg Soda Rule, and
the Ghost of Woodrow Wilson, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1859, 1866–67 (2013).
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after the enactment of an amendment to the New York City Smoke-Free Air Act
prohibiting electronic cigarettes in bars, restaurants, offices, parks, and benches. 16
Thus, when the Board of Health amended the N.Y. Health Code to include a
portion-cap on sugary beverages larger than sixteen ounces (in response to studies
indicating a strong link between sugary beverage consumption and obesity), 17 the
future of public health seemed promising not only in New York City, but also
nationwide. Under the amendment to section 81.53 of the N.Y. Health Code, food
service establishments would not be able to “sell, offer, or provide a sugary drink in
a cup or container that is able to contain more than 16 fluid ounces.” 18
The rule defines a “sugary drink” as:
a carbonated or non-carbonated beverage that: (A) is non-alcoholic; (B) is
sweetened by the manufacturer or establishment with sugar or another
caloric sweetener; (C) has greater than 25 calories per 8 fluid ounces of
beverage; and (D) does not contain more than 50 percent of milk or milk
substitute by volume as an ingredient. 19
Failure to comply with these regulations results in a fine of no more than $200
for each violation. 20
In defending the portion-cap, Public Health Commissioner Thomas called it a
“reasoned and reasonable response to the crisis.” 21 Sugary drinks, he continued, “can
bring on obesity and diabetes, and drinking just one sugary drink per day increases a
person’s risk. . . .” 22 In his statement supporting the cap, former Mayor Bloomberg
pinpointed obesity as “the only major public health issue we face.” 23 The National
16 Dan Goldberg, E-cig Ban Takes Effect, Soda Ban Receives Support, CAPITAL NEW
YORK
(Apr.
29,
2014),
http://www.capitalnewyork.com/article/cityhall/2014/04/8544439/capital-health-care-e-cig-ban-takes-effect-soda-ban-receives-suppo.
17

See generally Gail Woodward-Lopez et al., To What Extent Have Sweetened Beverages
Contributed to the Obesity Epidemic? 14 PUB.HEALTH NUTRITION 499 (2010). See also The
SCH.
PUB.
HEALTH,
Nutrition
Source,
Sugary
Drinks,
HARVARD
http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/nutritionsource/healthy-drinks/sugary-drinks/ (last visited Jan.
25, 2015) (summarizing Harvard University study showing that women who increased their
intake of sugary drinks over a four year period had significantly higher increases in weight
than those who reduced their sugary drink intake).
18
19
20

N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 24 § 81.53(b) (2012).
Id. at § 81.53(a)(1).
Id. at § 81.53(d).

21

Rob Waters, NYC Health Commissioner: Limiting Soda is the Right Way to Protect the
Health
of
New
Yorkers,
FORBES
(June
11,2013),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/robwaters/2013/06/11/nyc-health-commissioner-limiting-sodasize-is-the-right-way-to-protect-the-health-of-new-yorkers/.
22
23

Id.

Jill Colvin, Bloomberg Celebrates Court Decision on Soda Ban, OBSERVER.COM (Oct.
17, 2013), http://observer.com/2013/10/bloomberg-celebrates-court-decision-on-soda-cupregulations/#axzz31eQXjuhA.
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Alliance for Hispanic Health, along with various other interest organizations, also
pointed to studies demonstrating the strong link between the consumption of
sweetened beverages and obesity. 24 One study notes “sweetened beverages account
for at least one-fifth of the weight gained between 1977 and 2007 in the US
population.” 25 It also noted that underserved populations disproportionately consume
these beverages and that the portion-cap would “ease an unfair burden on the poor of
being the helpless victims of an industry where profits triumph [over] good health.” 26
Despite its justifications, the portion-cap faced significant backlash in the media
and in the political sphere. Some criticized the Mayor for infringing on individuals’
personal choice of beverage, while others voiced concern that it unfairly favored
certain businesses over others. 27 Some commentators expressed a fear that the cap
would prove ineffective and “poison the water for better solutions.” 28 The Chamber
of Commerce argued that the Board failed to properly evaluate the costs and benefits
of the ban and account for the “hundreds of thousands to millions of dollars” that
businesses presumably would suffer as a result of its enactment. 29
However, the portion-cap is an appropriate and cost-efficient solution to New
York City’s obesity crisis. A report conducted by Professor Shi-Ling Hsu indicates
that whereas the cost of sugary drink regulation could reach a maximum of $500
million, the benefits of such regulations could range from $3.2 billion to $13.2
billion. 30 According to the study, “the most known adverse health outcomes stem
from the contribution that sugary drinks have in making people obese.” 31
Accordingly, the sale of sugary drinks “imposes further [treatment] costs . . .
[including costs for] . . . type 2 diabetes, coronary heart disease, and a variety of
cancers.” 32 In conducting his cost-benefit analysis, Hsu takes two approaches. First,
24

Brief for the National Alliance for Hispanic Health, et. al. as Amici Curiae at 11–12,
N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce, v. The N.Y.C. Dep’t Of Health and
Mental Hygiene, 970 N.Y.S.2d 200 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013) (APL 2013-00291).
25 Gail Woodward-Lopez et al., To What Extent Have Sweetened Beverages Contributed
to the Obesity Epidemic? 14 PUB. HEALTH NUTRITION 499, 499 (2010).
26

Id. See also supra note 24 (citing Comment of Pastor Brian L. Carter, President,
Borough of Brooklyn Ecumenical Advisory Group at p. 27).
27

See e.g., Harned, supra note 2; Trinko, supra note 2.

28

Brian Wansink & David Just, How Bloomberg’s Soft Drink Ban Will Backfire on NYC
ATLANTIC.COM
(June
14,
2012),
Public
Health,
THE
http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2012/06/how-bloombergs-soft-drink-ban-willbackfire-on-nyc-public-health/258501/.
29 Notice of Motion for Leave to File Brief for the Chamber of Commerce of the United
States of America, National Black Chamber of Commerce, et. al as Amici Curiae, N.Y.
Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. The N.Y.C. Dep’t Of Health and
Mental Hygiene, 970 N.Y.S.2d 200 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013) (No. 653584/2012).
30 Shi-Ling Hsu, A Cost-Benefit Analysis of Sugary Drink Regulation in New York City,
FSU COLLEGE OF LAW, PUBLIC LAW RESEARCH PAPER NO. 661 1 (Feb. 14, 2014),
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2390854 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2390854.
31

Id. at 7.

32

Id.
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he focuses on the monetary costs stemming from obesity – namely, type 2 diabetes
and coronary heart disease. 33 Second, he focuses on productivity costs specifically
attributable to obesity. 34 By synthesizing studies from the American Medical
Association, 35 The National Center for Health Statistics, 36 and the Center for Disease
Control, 37 Hsu approximates the total cost of type 2 diabetes attributable to sugary
drink consumption in New York City at $3.6 billion, 38 the total cost of coronary
heart disease in New York City attributable to sugary drink consumption at $9.6
billion, 39 and the total productivity costs of obesity in New York City at $412
million. 40 The study concludes by determining that the benefits of the portion-cap,
estimated modestly, yield a 14:1 benefit-cost ratio. 41
Furthermore, although opposing city council members argued that the cap would
open the floodgates and give the Board of Health limitless authority to enact “even
more intrusive policies,” 42 comprehensive expert studies indicate that decreasing
portion sizes is the most tailored solution to address the problem of obesity. A recent
study by public health scholars Marion Nestle and Lisa R. Young indicates that the
sharp increase in obesity in recent years is largely due to excess calorie
consumption, 43 indicating “a need for greater attention to food portion size as a
factor in energy intake and weight management.” 44 Therefore, the portion-cap proves
to be a statistically supported and reasonable decision that demonstrates the
Department of Health’s understanding of the particular intricacies surrounding
obesity in New York City.
III.

THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH

The New York City Charter provides:
Except as otherwise provided by law, the department shall have
jurisdiction to regulate all matters affecting health in the city of New
York and to perform all those functions and operations performed by the

33

Id.

34

Id. at 10.

35

Id. at 12.

36

Id.

37

Id. at 16.

38

Id. at 15.

39

Id. at 19.

40

Id. at 21.

41

Id. at 24.

42

Id. at 7.

43

Lisa R. Young & Marion Nestle, The Contribution of Expanding Portion Sizes to the
Obesity Epidemic, 92 AM. J PUB. HEALTH, 246 (2002).
44

Id.
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city that relate to the health of the people of the city, including but not
limited to the mental health, mental retardation, alcoholism and substance
abuse-related needs of the people of the city. 45
The Health Code also grants the Department the specific authority to “regulate . .
. food . . . and ensure that such businesses and activities are conducted in a manner
consistent with the public interest.” 46 Prior to the 1987 Boreali decision, New York
courts interpreted this type of legislative delegation broadly. In People ex rel.
Knoblauch v. Warden of Jail of Fourth Dist. Magistrate’s Court, 47 for example, the
Appellate Division, Second Department regarded the Board (the Department of
Health’s policy-making arm) as “a statutory body [whose] powers are very broad –
well nigh plenary.” 48 Similarly, the New York State Court of Appeals in Grossman
v. Baumgartner 49 found delegation permissible to the extent that legislation did not
preempt state laws on the same matter. 50 Five years prior to Boreali, one court
described the Board of Health as “the sole legislative authority in the field of health
regulation in the City of New York.” 51
This broad reading of the Board’s ability to regulate all matters concerning
public health in New York City is in line with the legislative history of the Board.
The New York City Charter was revised in the mid-1900s to create a Board of
Health composed of physicians, police commissioners, and other experts, as opposed
to the previously city-run agency. 52 The change came as a result of critics calling for
“an independent city health department that would not be controlled by the corrupt
Tammany machine.” 53
IV. STATEWIDE AND BOREALI
Despite clear precedent and legislative intent to delegate broad authority to the
Department of Health, the Statewide court, relying on Boreali, struck the portion-cap
as an unconstitutional exercise of power. While the court recognized the
permissibility of delegations of power to administrative agencies, 54 it found that such
45 NEW
YORK CITY, N.Y., CHARTER
§
556
(2004),
available
http://www.nyc.gov/html/records/pdf/section%201133_citycharter.pdf (emphasis added).
46

Id.

47

See People ex rel. Knoblauch v. Warden, 216 N.Y. 154, 162 (1915).

48

Id.

49

Grossman v Baumgartner, 17 N.Y.2d 345, 351 (N.Y. 1966).

50

Id.

51

Schulman v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosps. Corp., 38 N.Y.2d 234, 237 (N.Y. 1975).

at

52

See THE N.Y. CITY DEP’T OF MENTAL HEALTH & HYGIENE, PROTECTING PUBLIC HEALTH
NEW YORK CITY: 200 YEARS OF LEADERSHIP 12 (2005), available at
http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/downloads/pdf/bicentennial/historical-booklet.pdf.

IN

53

Id.

54 See Statewide, supra note 4, at 207 (finding that the Board of Health possessed “no
inherent legislative power [to make] . . . broad-based public policy determinations.”).
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delegations should be interpreted narrowly. 55 Relying on language in Boreali v.
Axelrod, the court determined that the Board “invalid[ly] exercise[d] . . . legislative
power.” 56
In Boreali, the plaintiff challenged the Public Health Council’s (the predecessor
to the Department of Health) regulations governing smoking in public areas. In
striking down the regulations, the court delivered a paralyzing four-factor test that
precluded health agencies from using expertise and removal from the political
structure to implement sound regulations in the interest of public health. First, the
court determined that the Council improperly developed a scheme “based. . . upon
economic and social concerns” 57 other than health by carving out exemptions for
bars and convention centers. 58 Second, the court found that the Council wrote “on a
clean slate, creating its own comprehensive set of rules without benefit of legislative
guidance.” 59 Third, the court found that the regulations concerned “an area in which
the legislature had repeatedly tried – and failed – to reach agreement in the face of
substantial debate and vigorous lobbying by a variety of interested factions.” 60 The
court pointed to “the significance of legislative inaction as evidence that the
legislature [had] so far been unable to reach agreement on the goals and methods that
should govern” in this area. 61 Finally, the court found that the agency “overstepped
its bounds because the development of the regulations did not require expertise in the
field of health.” 62 The court found that all factors “when viewed in combination,
paint[ed] a portrait of an agency that has improperly assumed for itself . . . the
elected legislature’s role.” 63
The holding in Boreali changed the landscape of New York administrative law.
Under the new framework, the courts can now deny city agencies the authority to
promulgate overly “political” regulations. However, because no objective standard
exists to determine whether promulgations are indeed political, 64 New York case law
regarding delegation is inconsistent and more likely to be driven by the politics of
the judiciary than by legal criteria. The decision in Statewide serves as a clear
example.
Using Boreali’s four-factor analysis, the court in Statewide similarly found the
portion-cap unconstitutional. Addressing the first prong of the analysis, the
55

See id.

56

See id.

57

Boreali v. Axelrod, 71 N.Y.2d 1, 11 (N.Y. 1987).

58

Id. at 12.

59

See Statewide, supra note 4, at 207 (citing Boreali, 71 N.Y.2d 1, at 12).

60

Id.

61

Boreali, 71 N.Y.2d 1, at 14.

62

Statewide, supra note 4, at 207 (citing Boreali, 71 N.Y.2d 1, at 14).

63

Id.

64

See Richard B. Stewart, Beyond Delegation Doctrine, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 323, 343
(1987).
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Statewide court determined that the Department of Health’s exemption of certain
businesses, including grocery markets and 711 stores that had signed agreements
with the state’s Department of Agriculture, demonstrated that “the Board . . . took
into account its own non-health policy considerations.” 65 Under the second factor,
the court found that the legislature failed to enumerate the regulation of obesitycausing products as an “inherently harmful [matter] affecting the health of the
City,” 66 and that the ban, therefore, did not fall within “the kind of interstitial rule
making intended by the legislature and engaged in by the Board of Health in the
past.” 67 Under the third factor, the court found that because the City and State
legislatures had attempted (and failed) to enact various similar pieces of legislation
reducing sugary beverage consumption – warning labels, food stamp restrictions,
and taxes – the Board of Health circumvented the will of the legislature by
“[pursuing] the same end, and thus address[ing] the same policy areas as the
proposals rejected by the State and City legislatures.” 68 Finally, the court found “that
the Board of Health’s technical competence was [not] necessary to flesh out details
of the legislative policies embodied in the [portion-cap].” 69
The Statewide and Boreali decisions fall outside the trend of New York courts to
uphold similarly broad legislative promulgations and to recognize the Board as “the
sole legislative authority in the field of health regulation in the City of New York.” 70
Even after Boreali, New York courts have recognized the Board of Health’s
legislative authority without subjecting it to a four-factor analysis. For example, in
New York State Rest. Assn. v. New York City Dep't of Health & Mental Hygiene, the
New York Supreme Court found that because the charter provided that “the
Department shall have jurisdiction to regulate all matters affecting health in the City
of New York” and to “enforce all provisions of law applicable in the area under the
jurisdiction of the Department,” the Board had the statutory authority to promulgate
inspection procedures. 71 Furthermore, In Glass v. City of New York, 72 the court
upheld the Board of Health’s amendment to the health code prohibiting individuals
from owning ferrets, finding that the Board’s possession of broad authority to
regulate the keeping of animals was “not only reasonable and proper within the
overall municipal government structure; it [was] necessary for the protection of the
health and safety of the public.” 73
65

Statewide, supra note 4, at 210.

66

Id. at 211.

67

Id. at 212.

68

Id.

69

Id. at 213.

70

Schulman v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosps. Corp., 38 N.Y.2d 234 (N.Y. 1975).

71 New York State Rest. Ass’n v. N.Y.C. Dept. of Health & Mental Hygiene, 2004 NY
Slip Op 51290(U), 2004 WL 2423561 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 27, 2004).
72

See Glass v. City of New York, No.121839/99, 2002 WL 1461895 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June
14, 2002).
73

Id. at 2.
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Therefore, the Boreali decision set unclear precedent resulting in its inconsistent
and subjective application. Recognizing this error, the dissent properly criticized the
majority for arbitrarily resurrecting New Deal era principles prohibiting the
legislature from delegating decision-making power to administrative agencies. 74
V. THE NON-DELEGATION DOCTRINE
In striking the Public Health Council’s anti-smoking regulations, the Boreali
court relied heavily on Supreme Court articulations of the non-delegation doctrine, 75
which represents a judicial theory that disfavors delegation of legislative authority to
administrative agencies as an unconstitutional separation of powers violation. 76
However, although Supreme Court decisions frequently point to the non-delegation
doctrine when making
“categorical statements” 77 criticizing delegations of
78 on only three occasions has the Court invalidated regulations based on
authority,
non-delegation reasoning during the New Deal era. 79 Accordingly, various legal
scholars in the field of administrative law recognize that non-delegation is more of
an “empty formalism” than actual doctrine. 80 Scholar Louis Jaffe, for example, has
attributed the few New Deal cases finding impermissible delegations of authority as
“sports,” understandable merely in terms of the politics of the Justices of the
Supreme Court in 1935, rather than in terms of legal doctrine. 81 Furthermore, the
74

See Boreali, 71 N.Y.2d 1, 19–20 (N.Y. 1987) (Bellacosa, dissenting).

75

See id. at 10 (citing Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470 (1904)); Marshall Field & Co.
v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892).
76 See JERRY L. MASHAW, RICHARD A. MERRILL & PETER M. SHANE, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW: THE AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW SYSTEM CASES AND MATERIALS 72 (2009).
77

ERNEST GELLHORN & RONALD M. LEVEN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
(2006); see also MASHAW, MERRILL & SHANE, supra note 76.

AND

PROCESS 12

78 See, e.g., Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470 (1904) (upholding the board of tea
inspectors the authority to place standards on the sale of tea); see also United States v.
Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 517 (1911) (validating a broad statute enabling the Secretary of
Agriculture to issue regulations and criminal penalties regarding the preservation of national
forests while finding that delegation is only appropriate to “fill up the details.”); see also
Field, 143 U.S. 649 (“That Congress cannot delegate legislative power to the President is a
principle universally recognized as vital to the integrity and maintenance of the system of
government ordained by the constitution.”).
79

These decisions include Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935) (striking
down a statute giving power to prohibit interstate shipments of contraband oil, as it gave no
guidance as to circumstances, and the code, in any event, had never been published); A.L.A.
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (invalidating regulations under
the Live Poultry Act because of unclear legislative policy objectives and a lack of procedural
standards); and Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (finding that the mandating
statute improperly gave legislative power to representatives of the regulated industry).
80 LOUIS, L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 51–52 (1965); see also
GELLHORN & LEVEN, supra note 77, at 13.
81 See MASHAW, MERRILL & SHANE, supra note 76, at 74 (citing JAFFE, supra note 80, at
51–52).
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most recent articulation of the non-delegation doctrine only finds that delegation is
improper when legislation fails to indicate an “intelligible principle” to guide agency
action. 82
While the states have historically been more prone to develop varied nondelegation doctrines, 83 more recent state decisions indicate that courts are beginning
to move away from non-delegation principles. 84 Many of the states that do
82

See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 474 (2001).

In the history of the Court we have found the requisite ‘intelligible principle’ lacking
in only two statutes, one of which provided literally no guidance for the exercise of
discretion, and the other of which conferred authority to regulate the entire economy
on the basis of no more precise a standard than stimulating the economy by assuring
‘fair competition.’
Id.; see also Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 785–86 (1948) (upholding delegation of
authority to determine excessive profits); Am. Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 105–
06 (1946) (upholding delegation to SEC to prevent unfair or inequitable distribution of voting
power among security holders); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 426–27 (1944)
(upholding delegation to price administrator to fix commodity prices that would be fair and
equitable); Nat'l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 225–26 (1943) (upholding
delegation to FCC to regulate broadcast licensing as public interest, convenience, or necessity
require). Federal (and state) courts do, however, still express concern where legislative
authority is given to private industries. See Ass'n of Am. Railroads v. U.S. Dep't of Transp.,
721 F.3d 666, 668 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (striking Section 207 of the Rail Investment and
Improvement Act of 2008 which “empowered Amtrak and the Federal Railroad
Administration (FRA) to jointly develop performance measures to enhance enforcement of the
statutory priority Amtrak's passenger rail service has over other trains.”). While the court in
American Railroads utilized the nondelegation doctrine, it also noted that nondelegation has
little practical application outside of this context because “no statute can be entirely precise,”
meaning “some judgments, even some judgments involving policy considerations, must be left
to the officers executing the law and to the judges applying it.” Id. (citing Mistretta v. United
States, 488 U.S. 361, 415 (1989)).
83 See Jim Rossi, Institutional Design and the Lingering Legacy of Antifederalist
Separation of Powers Ideals in the States, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1167, 1220 (1999). Professor
Rossi groups these approaches into three categories—weak, strong, and moderate
nondelegation states. Id. States adopting a strong nondelegation approach require delegating
statutes to possess strict standards and safeguards. Id. Weak nondelegation states, on the other
hand, adopt the Supreme Court approach and recognize virtually any procedural safeguards as
sufficient. Id. Moderate delegation states fall between the two, and require only loose
standards and safeguards. Id.
84

See Roe v. Replogle, 408 S.W.3d 759, 763–66 (Mo. 2013) (relying on a Supreme Court
analysis when upholding a delegation to require sex-offender registration); S. Alliance for
Clean Energy v. Graham, 113 So. 3d 742, 745 (Fla. 2013) (noting that “it is not this Court's
function to substitute its judgment for that of the Legislature as to the wisdom or policy of a
particular statute.” (citing State v. Rife, 789 So.2d 288, 292 (Fla. 2001))); City of San
Antonio v. Salvaggio, 419 S.W.3d 605, 610 (Tex. App. 2013), review denied (Apr. 25, 2014)
(finding that hearing examiner did not act as a policy maker under the nondelegation
doctrine); TECO Mech. Contractor, Inc. v. Com., 366 S.W.3d 386 (Ky. 2012), as corrected
(June 27, 2012) (finding that sufficient safeguards prevented state cabinet from abusing any
legislative or judicial authority granted to it under prevailing wage law, and thus law did not
violate state constitution's non-delegation doctrine.); Thomas v. Henry, 260 P.3d 1251 (Okla.
2011) (statutory provisions requiring verification of immigration status through “query to Law
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implement the non-delegation doctrine only do so when agency capture becomes a
concern, as in Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 85 or when the legislation lacks appropriate
safeguards. 86 One explanation for courts’ hesitancy to use the non-delegation
doctrine lies in the difficulty of its implementation. The task of developing
consistent standards has proven impossible, both at the state and federal level. 87
Harvard Law Professor Richard B. Stewart highlights Justice Rehnquist’s utilization
of the doctrine to further illustrate this point. Stewart notes that Rehnquist, in
Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., voted to strike an
OSHA provision setting standards to eliminate toxic occupational health risks “to the
extent feasible,” but voted a year later to uphold a delegation to the FCC to regulate
pursuant to the “public interest” in FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild. 88 Such
inconsistency in application, he argues, can only be explained by subjective political
motivations. 89
VI. TYPICAL CONCERNS UNDERLYING DELEGATION AND WHY THEY DO NOT APPLY
IN THIS CASE
While we cannot know for certain why Boreali diverged from New York’s
previous non-delegation view and why Statewide chose to follow that view, a variety
of concerns could have come into play. Professor Rossi notes that several differences
between the states and federal governments account for stronger adherence to non-

Enforcement Support Center of the United States Department of Homeland Security” and to
notify Department of Homeland Security if immigration status could not be verified were not
impermissible delegations of authority to federal government); Conner v. N. C. Council of
State 716 S.E. 2d 836 (N.C. 2011) (finding that “strict adherence to ideal notions of the nondelegation doctrine would unduly hamper the General Assembly in the exercise of its
constitutionally vested powers.); McNeil v. Charlevoix County, 772 N.W.2d 18 (Mich. 2009)
(upholding the local health department’s rule restricting smoking in public places despite
plaintiff’s assertion that nothing in the enabling statute authorized the health department to
enforce such restrictions).
85

See Krielow v. La. Dep't of Agric. & Forestry, 125 So. 3d 384, 395–96 (La. 2013)
(finding that “[t]he Rice Statutes . . . violate the non-delegation doctrine by giving a private
group the power to decide whether the law governing the refunds will change.”); City of
Hous. v. BCCA Appeal Grp., Inc., 01-11-00332-CV, 2013 WL 4680224 (Tex. App. Aug. 29,
2013) (noting that the non-delegation doctrine “should be used sparingly” and only when
delegation is made to a private organization (citing Texas Boll Weevil Eradication Found.,
Inc. v. Lewellen, 952 S.W.2d 454, 475 (Tex.1997))). Note also that the Pennsylvania
constitution specifically precludes delegations to special commissions and private
organizations other than the police and fire department. See Lancaster Cnty. v. Pa. Labor Rels.
Bd., 35 A.3d 83, 88 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2012).
86 See Whiley v. Scott, 79 So. 3d 702 (Fla. 2011) (holding that the delegation was
impermissible to the extent that it suspended and terminated rulemaking by precluding notice
publication and other compliance with the state administrative procedure act).
87

See Stewart, supra note 64, at 342.

88

See id. at 325.

89

See id. at 342–43.
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delegation doctrines. 90 First, differences in institutional design might justifiably call
for a divergence in approach. For example, local governments might become more
subject to agency capture due to the geographic proximity to special-interest groups
(such as farming corporations) or because of short legislative sessions. 91
Furthermore, many state courts might adopt a strong non-delegation approach to
supplant its state’s weak Administrative Procedure Act. 92 Second, adherence to the
non-delegation doctrine can be explained by a “Common American Heritage”
approach, where the courts will generally adhere to Supreme Court reasoning, but
will stray from such reasoning on occasions where the Supreme Court “has gotten it
wrong.” 93
Finally, and less justifiably, Rossi notes that several states root their reliance on
non-delegation principles in anti-federalist views, masking them as textual
arguments. 94 When assessed objectively, he finds that this arguments fails “as an
interpretive method in the separation of powers context because it does not explain
differences . . . between systems with similar separation of powers clauses in their
constitutions.” 95 Under this view, the Boreali and Statewide decisions more likely
stem from anti-federalist or political notions, similar to the handful of New Deal
cases that struck down otherwise lawful delegations of authority. As an example, the
Boreali court frequently cites to the New York City Charter, most likely to signal
that it possesses certain unique qualities that call for non-delegation. 96 In analyzing
that Charter, however, Boreali relies heavily on Supreme Court case law arising out
of the New Deal era, undermining the assumption that its own constitution uniquely
calls for non-delegation. 97 Furthermore, the Boreali and Statewide decisions cannot
be explained by Rossi’s other justifiable rationales.

90

See e.g., Rossi, supra note 83.

91

Id. at 1224–25.

92

Id.

93

See id. at 1240; see also James A. Gardner, What Is a State Constitution?, 24 RUTGERS
L.J. 1025, 1044–54 (1993) (arguing that state constitutions are not the embodiment of
independent political values, but instead are safeguards that reinforce national political values
where the federal government has failed to do so).
94 See Rossi, supra note 83, at 1172–73. While Rossi’s observation that anti-federalist
views are often masked by textual or Common American Heritage arguments from over a
decade prior, a search of the few non-delegation driven decisions arising within the past five
years indicates that this trend has not changed. See, e.g., Hobbs v. Jones, 412 S.W.3d 844, 847
(Ark. 2012) (citing to the Arkansas state constitution in its determination that general
guidelines allowing the Arkansas Department of Corrections to conduct lethal injections were
too broad and constituted an unlawful delegation of legislative authority to the state executive
agency).
95

Rossi, supra note 83, at 1220.

96

See generally Boreali v. Axelrod, 517 N.E.2d 1350 (N.Y. 1987).

97

Id. at 1355.
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First, the institutional design of the city’s government closely parallels that of the
federal government; 98 accordingly, sufficient safeguards are in place to account for
failures in agency action. Furthermore, agency capture seems unlikely given the
composition of the Board and the nature of the regulated industries. Unlike those
state decisions concerned with industry influence, 99 the Board, in accordance with its
role as an unbiased, expert agency, made decisions that were strongly disfavored by
the regulated industries. City Council members, on the other hand, have more
opportunities than Board members to become conflicted as paid representatives. 100
Accordingly, by relying heavily on the Boreali precedent, the Statewide court
also was able to “bury in doctrinal subterfuge the micropolitical factors that
influence[d] [its] doctrinal [approach].” 101 Whereas the New York state courts have
upheld regulations on calorie listing, personal pet ownership, and the promulgation
of inspection requirements, it arbitrarily struck down the regulations at issue in
Boreali and Statewide based on reasoning that can only be explained by subjective
political views.
VII. ANALYSIS AND SUGGESTIONS
A. The July Decision
The New York Court of Appeals’ decision not only failed to improve the health
of thousands of New Yorkers, but also upheld an improper implementation of a
judicial doctrine that paralyzes agencies by precluding them from carrying out their
important roles as expert rule-makers. The current approach not only proves
unworkable in practice, but also opens the door for the judiciary to supplant agency
and legislative action with its own power. 102 Under this framework, neither
legislators nor agency experts have decision-making power; instead, an unelected
judiciary has granted itself the authority to determine the merits of legislative
98 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7803 (McKinney 2013) (supplemental commentary) (“Similar
language may be found in § 9(e) of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.A. §
1009(e), § 207(f) of the proposed Administrative Code, and § 12(7)(e) of the Model State
Administrative Procedure Act."); see also Frederick Davis, Judicialization of Administrative
Law: The Trial-Type Hearing and the Changing Status of the Hearing Officer, DUKE L.J. 388,
389 (1977) (“Other states, such as New York and Iowa, adhere more closely to the federal
model. . . ”).
99

See e.g., Krielow v. La.,125 So. 3d 384, 395–96 (La. 2013); City of Hous. v. BCCA
Appeal Group, Inc., No. 01-11-00332-CV., 2013 WL 4680224 (Tex. Civ. App. 2013); Texas
Boll Weevil Eradication Found. Inc. v. Lewellen, 952 S.W.2d 454, 475 (Tex. 1997).
100

For example, Council member Christine Quinn received $9,750 dollars of funding from
interested parties, including sixteen high-ranking Coca-Cola employees. See Michael M.
Grynbaum, Quinn, Cool to Soda Ban, Gets Donations From Coke, (January 25, 2013), N.Y.
Times, (Jan. 25, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/26/nyregion/coke-executives-givechristine-quinns-campaign-9750.html.Similarly, Council members Letitia James, Melissa
Mark-Viverto, and Daniel R. Garodnick all received substantial campaign contributions from
PepsiCo. Id.
101

Rossi, supra note 83, at 1172–73.

102

See supra Part I.
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decisions. 103 The decision in Boreali, and New York’s reliance upon it in Statewide,
not only misapplies federal and state case law but also allows for courts to make
arbitrary judgment call[s] of [their] own,” 104 and creates a standard by which the
courts can pick and choose when to use Boreali’s precedent to exercise its discretion
in striking down regulations.
Rather than adhere to an unpredictable and outdated doctrine, the Court of
Appeals should have instead analyzed whether the Board’s process in promulgating
regulations was thorough and accounted for abuses of power. The state
Administrative Procedure Act serves as an appropriate starting point for this
purpose. Under its provisions, agency regulations are granted deference absent a
finding that they are “arbitrary and capricious.” 105 While the petitioners in Statewide
claimed that the cap failed to meet this standard, 106 the court did not address the
question because it had already determined that the Board lacked legislative
authority. 107 In any event, the portion-cap was not arbitrary and capricious because,
as discussed in Part II, 108 statistical analyses indicate that reducing portion sizes
might be the most necessary step that governments can take to reduce obesity.
Furthermore, although the lower court found the rule arbitrary due to “loopholes”
excluding certain restaurant businesses and beverages, 109 New York case law (as
noted in the City’s brief) recognizes that such administrative regulations are still
valid, even when they only address “part of a perceived concern.” 110 Therefore, the
portion-cap under this test would likely pass constitutional muster, especially since
an “administrative agency's exercise of its rule-making powers is accorded a high
degree of judicial deference, especially when the agency acts in the area of its
particular expertise.” 111

103

See supra Part IV.

104

See generally Boreali v. Axelrod, 517 N.E.2d 1350, 1359 (Bellacosa, dissenting).

105

N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7803 (McKinney 2003); see also Matter of Consolation Nursing
Homes, Inc. v. Comm’r New York State Dep’t of Health, 85 N.Y.2d 326, 331 (N.Y. 1995)
(“The standard for judicial review of an administrative regulation is whether the regulation has
a rational basis and is not unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious.”).
106

See Statewide, supra note 4, at 213.

107

Id.

108

See supra Part II.

109

See Statewide, supra note 4, at 213.

110 Brief for the National Association of County and City Health Officials, et. al. as Amici
Curiae at 19, New York Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. The New
York City Dep’t. of Health and Mental Hygiene, 16 N.E.3d 538 (N.Y. 2014), 2014 WL
2995965 (citing New York State Health Facilities Ass’n v. Axelrod, 77 N.Y.2d 340, 350
(1991); New York State Rest. Ass’n v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Health, 556 F.3d 114, 133 n.22 (2d Cir.
2009).
111 Consolation Nursing Home, Inc. v. Comm’r of New York State Dep’t of Health, 85
N.Y.2d 326, 331 (N.Y. 1995).
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B. Strengthening Agency Independence
Moving forward, New York City would benefit from strengthening the Board’s
independence of the Mayor’s office. Mayor De Blasio’s recent election affords his
office a ripe opportunity to encourage such structural changes. 112 While the current
Board of Health has maintained independence from City Council, it remains closely
intertwined with the Mayor. Currently, DeBlasio has the power to appoint and
dismiss members of the Board of Health. 113 While these members have little to lose
from dismissal (they are unpaid volunteers), the appointment process may lead the
courts and the public to question whether their intentions are apolitical. 114
Accordingly, while the power of appointment should rest in the Mayor, giving City
Council the opportunity to object when it can present clear evidence indicating that
Board members do not meet the qualifications set forth in the City Charter may serve
to advance a more independently structured Board. Furthermore, the City Council
should be able to nominate Board members for Mayoral consideration.
The fact that the portion cap was largely written by the former Mayor’s office
and was immediately enacted by the Board of Health is indicative of the concerns
surrounding the Board’s significant relationship and seeming reliance on the
Mayor’s office. 115 As noted by the Statewide court, not unreasonably, this practice
further undermines the contention that the Board of Health acts based on specialized
expertise. 116 Accordingly, the Board of Health may benefit from developing a set of
standards to follow when considering regulations proposed by outside branches.
C. Increasing Public Education
In an administrative state where the non-delegation doctrine runs strong, the best
approach to passing groundbreaking rules governing public health is to win public
support. For example, in its amicus brief, City Council members argue that the transfat ban only passed constitutional muster because the City Council chose to endorse
it. 117 While no case law supports the notion that a legislative branch’s endorsement
of an agency rule signals the agency’s lack of legislative power, the council
members’ argument points to the importance of gaining public support. Before
112

See generally De Blasio Announces Major Reform of City’s ‘Outdate’ Corporate Tax
Structure, THE FORUM (Jan. 15, 2015), http://theforumnewsgroup.com/2015/01/15/de-blasioannounces-major-reform-of-citys-outdated-corporate-tax-structure/ (discussing the new
expansive structural tax reforms Mayor De Blasio plans on making in 2015).
113

New
York
City,
N.Y.,
Charter
§
551
(2004),
http://www.nyc.gov/html/records/pdf/section%201133_citycharter.pdf.

available

at

114 See Diller, supra note 15, at 1897–99 (2013) (discussing ways in which the portion cap
strays from the Wilsonian ideal of agency rulemaking).
115

See Statewide, supra note 4, at 213.

116

See id. at 212-13; see also Diller, supra note 15, at 1897.

117 Brief for Petitioners at 212–13, New York Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of
Commerce v. The New York City Dep’t. Of Health and Mental Hygiene, 970 N.Y.S.2d 200
(N.Y. App. Div. 2013) (arguing that City Council’s approval of the trans-fat ban “actually
emphasizes the limits of the Board’s authority – the Board cannot enact rules on its own
establishing).
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enacting the trans-fat ban, various local businesses were convinced to begin
switching to alternatives. 118 As restaurants began using replacement products, the
notion of banning trans-fat appeared more realistic and feasible for both local
businesses and presumably the City Council. 119 Accordingly, the Board of Health
may find its regulation better received and less open to judicial scrutiny if it wins the
support of the public prior to its enactment. This could involve, for example,
incentivizing businesses to voluntarily replace sugary beverages (for example, with
diet versions) and increasing public education campaigns bringing attention to the
harms associated with their consumption. 120
VIII. CONCLUSION
The portion cap was a promising regulation that had the potential not only to
improve the health of New Yorkers, but also of the nation. Unfortunately, the court’s
current non-delegation approach stifled the Board’s endeavors. Furthermore, the
Court of Appeals failed to seize its unique opportunity to act as a model for public
health and correct archaic precedent that paralyzes agencies from carrying out their
intended functions. As a result, the Board of Health must now explore alternative
options for enacting regulations seeking to improve public health, such as increasing
public awareness and agency independence.

118 David B. Caruso, Bloomberg Trans Fat Ban in NYC Set Model for FDA (Nov. 8, 2013),
available
at
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/11/08/bloomberg-transfat_n_4239264.html.

119

Id. The article states:

[B]y the time New York's phased-in ban took full effect in 2008, relatively little
enforcement had to be done. The market had already adjusted. It helped that partially
hydrogenated vegetable oil, originally marketed in the early 1900s as a cheap
substitute for butter and lard, is tasteless. It was hard to find diners who noticed any
difference after New York's changes took effect.
Id.
120 Paul A. Simon et. al., Declines in Sugar-Sweetened Beverage Consumption Among
Children in Los Angeles County, 2007 and 2011, 10 Preventing Chronic Disease (2013)
available at http://www.cdc.gov/pcd/issues/2013/13_0049.htm (showing evidence that
reduced sugary soda beverages among Latino communities suggests that community
education programs may be effective).

